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On January 23rd, 2019, a multitudinous crowd occupied the streets of Caracas,
demanding President Nicolas Maduro’s resignation and the formation of a new
Government. Opposition Leader and President of the National Assembly Juan
Guaidó was sworn in as Interim President of the Republic. Guaidó invokes Article
233 of the Venezuelan Constitution, according to which the President of the National
Assembly may assume presidential functions in the case of an ‘absolute absence of
the President elect’. He also relies on Article 333, which addresses the protection of
the constitutional order from acts of force. Guaidó’s Proclamation and his promise
of fresh elections sowed hope among many Venezuelans who are suffering the
consequences of an unprecedented economic crisis, with the inflation rate reaching
1.300.000% in 2018. 
Venezuela is divided into two opposite sets of institutions with competing claims to
power. On the one side of the spectrum, there is Guaidó. He enjoys support from
the National Assembly, which has been under control of opposition parties since the
2015 parliamentary elections. The Supreme Court in exile, whose members were
appointed in July 2017 by the National Assembly, also backs Guaidó. On the other
side of the spectrum there is the Maduro regime. Maduro claims that he was elected
President for the 2019-2025 term in the May 2018 elections, which opposition
leaders and numerous States consider illegitimate because of the absence of a fair
and free democratic election (cf. OAS Resolution 2929/18). The Supreme Court in
exile declared the 2018 election null and void. Maduro has nonetheless received
support from the Constituent Assembly he convened in 2017, the Supreme Court in
situ and the military. 
States all over the world face now a choice between two parallel regimes. Only
one can be recognized as legitimate. As expressed by U.S. Secretary of State
Pompeo at the UN Security Council, ‘now it’s time for every other nation to pick a
side’. In principle, international law does not require States to establish a democratic
political organization. A Government’s recognition most typically depends on political
reality and, particularly, on its ability to exercise effective control (cf. Roth, pp.
137 et seq.). This article argues that, against the backdrop of a split society and
rival institutions, coupled with massive protests and widespread civic resistance,
democratic legitimation provides a solid criterion for recognition (cf. Herdegen, pp.
207 et seq.). In the case of Venezuela, the National Assembly is the only institution
whose democratic legitimacy remains unchallenged. Guaidó is thus a reasonable
choice.
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The race for recognition
The race for recognition already started. Shortly after Guaido’s Proclamation, the
Governments of the Lima Group (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá and Perú) and the United States recognized
him as Interim President. The Secretary-General of the Organization of American
States [OAS], Luis Almagro, welcomed Guaido’s Proclamation as a fundamental
step in bringing Venezuela back to the path of Democracy. Almagro’s declaration is
consistent with OAS Permanent Council’s decision ‘to not recognize the legitimacy of
Nicolas Maduro’s new term’ (Resolution 1117/19).
Still, Maduro secured support from a few Latin American States, such as Bolivia,
Cuba and Nicaragua, as well as from Russia and Turkey. Moreover, the UN Security
Council was unable to reach an agreement on the Venezuelan crisis. Russia
characterized U.S. recognition of Guaidó as ‘another demonstration of its total
disregard for the norms and principles of international law and an attempt to pose
as the self-imposed master of another nation’s future’. China has also opposed
recognition of Guaidó, underscoring ‘[the principle of] non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs’. 
Other States remain cautious. The EU issued a Declaration stating that ‘in the
absence of an announcement on the organization of fresh elections with the
necessary guarantees over the next days, the EU will take further actions, including
on the issue of recognition’. The Mexican Government expressed concern for the
political situation of Venezuela without recognizing Guaidó as Head of State. The
Mexican President invoked Mexico’s strict policy of non-intervention in the internal
affairs of other States. This policy is in line with the Estrada Doctrine (1930). 
Recognition and the consent of the governed
There has been much debate as to whether recognition shall solely depend on a
Government’s ability to exercise actual control over a territory and its population,
or whether legitimacy – democratic or otherwise – should play a role in this regard
(cf. Roth, pp. 136 et seq.). It is beyond doubt, however, that policies of recognition
have traditionally taken into consideration the people’s consent or, at least, passive
obedience or acquiescence to the rule of those who yield power (cf. Lauterpacht, pp.
115 et seq.). The existence of democratic institutions facilitates the ascertainment
of such consent or, using Thomas Jefferson’s formula on recognition, the presence
of ‘[a Government] which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared’.
Active opposition against Maduro’s Government sheds doubts on the existence
of consent by the governed. Open civic disobedience to a Government moreover
indicates an absence of effective control over the population (cf. Lauterpacht, p.
115).
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The role of democratic legitimation
General international law does not prescribe the political organization of States.
In the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion (1975), the ICJ held that ‘no rule of
international law […] requires the structure of a State to follow any particular
pattern’ (ICJ Rep 12 [1975] para 94). Still, where neither of two rival governments
exercises territorial control or there is active resistance against their authority,
democratic legitimation is a solid criterion to make a choice. Democracy has
sometimes even taken precedence over naked military force. It is not uncommon for
States to withhold recognition of Governments established through a Coup d’État
which overthrows a democratically-legitimated Government. Moreover, the UN
Security Council has adopted measures against regimes established by military
force against elected Governments (cf. Resolutions 1132/97 and 841/93). Herdegen
observes ‘a shift of accent from a fixation in effectiveness and protection of the
status quo to a democratically and constitutionally-based legitimacy’ (author’s
translation, p. 204.).
Democracy has a particularly prominent role in the American continent. Many
States have historically followed the Tobar Doctrine (1907), which posits the non-
recognition of revolutionary governments established in violation of the constitution.
In the 1960s Venezuela itself adopted a strict policy of non-recognition of regimes
established against the authority of elected Governments (Betancourt Doctrine; see
Document 27 here).
In the Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS Member States elevated democracy
to a sine qua non condition for the legitimate exercise of sovereign authority in the
region by recognizing that ‘[t]he peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy
and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it’ (Article 1). The
Charter addresses cases involving ‘an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic
order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
impairs the democratic order in a member state’ (Article 19). Those situations are
considered as ‘an insurmountable obstacle’ to participation in the OAS and carry
suspension from the Organization (Articles 19-21).
The OAS Permanent Council declared the existence of an interruption of the
constitutional order in Venezuela in 2017, after an attempt by the Supreme Court
to assume the National Assembly’s legislative functions (Resolution 1078/17).
Later on, the OAS General Assembly asserted that the 2018 election ‘lacks
legitimacy’ (Resolution 2929/18). Thus, even before Guaidó’s Proclamation, the
OAS only recognized the National Assembly and the Supreme Court in exile as
‘democratic institutions’ in Venezuela. In a recent statement, the EU declared, too,
that the National Assembly is ‘the democratic legitimate body of Venezuela’. 
These statements indicate that the National Assembly is the only organ whose
democratic legitimacy is beyond dispute. The fact that Guaidó enjoys express
support from the National Assembly provides a strong argument in favor of his
recognition as Interim President of Venezuela.
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The time is ripe for recognition
Contending Governments have per se incompatible legitimacy claims. No State
can therefore simultaneously grant de jure recognition to more than one rival
Government (cf. Talmon, p. 105). Recognition of Guaidó as de jure President of
Venezuela necessary implies denying de jure recognition to Maduro, and vice-versa.
States stand now before a choice. Neither Maduro nor Guaidó are in full control of
the country. Still, as a result of the National Assembly’s support, only Guaidó has
a credible legitimacy claim. As Interim President, Guaidó’s mission is to organize a
new and fair Presidential election. Democracy is on his side.
* Sebastián Mantilla-Blanco is a Research Associate at the Institute of Public Law of
the University of Bonn.
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